Quick! Name something that the majority of economists have not gotten right in over 50 years. Some of you are thinking smart-alec comments like “owning a tie without gravy stains” or “having a firm handshake” but the answer pertains to the most important function of their jobs.
Give up? It turns out that forecasting a recession, arguably the single most important bit of prognostication they perform, has completely eluded the economic profession for over 50 years.
Risks of recession continuing to rise
Economy is slowing, showing warning flags
By Will Deener, Dallas Morning News, Published October 9, 2006
Most major polls of economists have said the chances of a recession and its ill-begotten progeny, a bear market, are very low.
While stock market bulls may take comfort in that, they should remember this: Not one recession in the past 50 years was forecast in advance by a major poll of economic forecasters, said James Stack, a market historian and editor of InvesTech Research.
Recessions and bears can and often do arrive unexpectedly. Savvy investors simply cannot rely on assurances that the economy won’t lapse into recession, generally defined as two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth.
Recent polls of economists put the odds of this at less than 25 percent.
Why does this matter to us? Because the airwaves and newspapers are full of economist’s rosy guesses about the future and you need to know that their guesses turn out to be worse than random. Even a monkey throwing darts would at least predict a recession some of the time. But economists never do. In fact, we might speculate that such a poor, one-way track record reveals an institutional bias to ‘be positive’.
Either that or their profession needs to take a good, hard, long-overdue look at its methods and tools.
In any case, one would be well advised to take what economists take with a grain of salt or, more accurately, to take whatever they say with a grain of pessimism.
You need more proof?
Try this out. Economics 101 teaches us that prices are a function of supply and demand. If demand goes up, prices go up, and vice versa. Similarly if supply goes up prices go down, and vice versa. This is the most basic, unquestioned, bedrock, foundational, provable economic principle there is.
So how do we explain this article?
The unsold inventory of new homes in Orange County is at the highest level since 1996, according to an economic forecast released Friday in Irvine.
Through August, sales of existing homes in Orange County were off 29 percent compared to the same period a year ago, the largest year-over-year decline, according to the UCLA Anderson Forecast: Orange County Economic Outlook for 2007.
The rate of sales over the last five months have been “brutally low,” with Southern California home sales falling to their lowest level in nine years last month, according to the forecast.
“Sales of new and existing homes are down 30 percent or more from the peaks established in 2003 and 2004, and home price appreciation has slowed to single digits in most areas. This slowdown has taken its toll on the California economy.”
So, testing out our handy-dandy Econ-101 formula on the paragraphs above we find that supply is way up (highest in a decade) while demand is “brutally low” and down some 30% from a year ago levels. The supply numbers indicate prices should fall, as does the demand information. Both are saying the same thing. Clearly Econ 101 would predict that prices would need to fall substantially to clear up such an imbalance.
Let’s read a bit in the article to find out what the economists think about this:
The report noted that what usually happens when a real estate market bubble bursts “is that sales just dry up” because buyers won’t buy homes at the listed price and sellers are unwilling to cut their prices. It described the result as “the economic equivalent of Chinese water torture” — with the decline in prices starting slowly but lasting a long time.
The economists said they do not expect a major decline in home prices this year.
What? Huh? Then do they expect a major decline next year? Or will the declines not be major? Or do they not expect any declines at all? All of that is left unsaid but I will leave you with this advice; do not take any real estate advice from economists – if you do, you can expect a major decline in your financial net worth. That’s just Econ 101.
Another piece of news from this week that needs decoding was the President’s claim that ‘the deficit has been cut in half’.
As we discussed in the lecture series, such claims rest on the use of accounting gimmicks that would land the accounting departments of private businesses in jail. But I’ve harped on this enough that I’ll take a break and let Peter Schiff of Euro Pacific Capital tell the tale:
This week, while President Bush took credit for supposedly cutting the enormous budget deficit in half, the Commerce Department reported that the trade deficit in August was a record $69.9 billion. Annualized, the trade gap comes to well over $800 billion of foreign-made merchandise tacked onto our national charge card, a figure that dwarfs the federal budget deficit by comparison.
In the first place, the fact that President Bush maintains a straight face while claiming to be a deficit cutter is a testament to his political skills and the media’s and Wall Street’s gullibility. Who does the President think he is kidding? So far, the national debt has increased by about three trillion dollars during his presidency, or about $500 billion per year. Those are the real numbers. The non-sense budget deficit the government reports excludes off-budget items and money borrowed from government “trust funds.”
However, expenditures excluded from official budget numbers still must be financed, and the money borrowed to do so adds to the national debt. In addition, those numbers do not reflect expenses accrued during the year but not yet paid. Were such expenses properly accounted for, the official deficit would be several hundred billion dollars higher. Finally, the numbers do not include any growth in contingent liabilities, which now exceed $40 trillion, making the actual national debt over eight times the official figure, which includes only the funded portion.
The last paragraph (above) is the heart of the matter – the US government simply excludes all sorts of very real expenditures and accrued liabilities when deriving the ‘budget deficit’. By hiding the true state of our fiscal descent into third world status, and by observing the way that our media aggressively avoids performing the 10 minutes of leg-work necessary to paint the true picture, we can conclude that our nation has a huge future problem that it has no interest in hearing about. I call it the Ostrich Phenomenon. It is wanton denial by the people we have entrusted with our future, which is precisely why you and I are working to create solutions at the local level.
And how can we explain the fact that Big Media has been utterly unable to comprehend the most basic of budgetary and accounting principles to bring us the straight story? I’ll let author Upton Sinclair explain it in a single sentence:
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his job depends on not understanding it.”
That sums it up nicely. Under the current operating rules of DC, any reporter that told the truth would be excluded from press conferences and barred from black tie dinners. Which means they would effectively be out of a job. Hence, our persistent confusion over a very simple matter of accounting.
Now let’s turn our roving eye back upon housing; the most important determinant of our economic future.
I’m not entirely sure what the author of this Newsweek piece means by “endgame” for housing since we are surely in the very first innings of a correction in the housing market, but he correctly notes that much hinges on the outcome.
Oct. 16, 2006 issue - We are at the endgame for housing. Until recently, our national motto has been “in real estate we trust.” Just last week, the Census Bureau reported that median home prices after inflation rose 32 percent from 2000 to 2005. In some places, the gains were huge: 127 percent in San Diego, 110 percent in Los Angeles and 79 percent in New York. But real estate—which has acted as a national piggy bank, with homeowners borrowing and spending against rising house prices—no longer looks so trustworthy. On this, more than falling oil prices or a record Dow, hangs the economy’s immediate fate.
But then he goes on to lose it by quoting an … wait for it … wait for it…economist.
Economist Richard Green of George Washington University thinks much of the run-up of home prices is permanent, reflecting lower long-term interest rates. As rates dropped, buyers could afford to pay more. I largely agree with this view.
It’s an interesting argument, this “permanent” plateau of housing prices theory, but it ignores much. For example, 28% of all homes purchased last year were by speculators who mainly used adjustable rate mortgages of one flavor (e.g. interest only) or another (e.g. negative amortization). I would think that an economist would both have this sort of information and realize that ARM interest rates are set based on short-term, not long-term, interest rates.
Yet he cites the decline in long-term interest rates as the primary factor for why housing prices are likely going to remain stuck at a new permanent plateau of prosperity. Hmmmm. I guess I’ll bust the quote out again.
”It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his job depends on not understanding it.”
And to further my confusion, surely the economist above realizes that prices are set at the margin, meaning that the last sale sets the price for the whole market. And surely he also realizes that speculators are unlike homeowner/residents who typically have more choices in whether or not list their house for sale and at what price.
Speculators who bought in 2004 and 2005 are guaranteed to be bleeding red ink from their portfolio of houses since current rental rates are so far below the carrying costs of ownership and further that growth in the stock of housing has outstripped population growth meaning there simply are not enough families out there to rent all the available houses.
A speculator who is watching house prices tumble, and who is draining their life savings as they wait for the tide to turn, will at some point hit their personal point of maximum financial pain and they unload at whatever prices the market can bear. I’d love to hear an economist explain how that particular fiscal reality is going to be permanently delayed because “long-term rates are lower”.
To continue on, I have a friend in California who is weighing their own sell/hold decision and so I’ll continue with reports from CA gleaned from the media this past week in the hopes that he might find the information useful.
First, a report on foreclosure activity in San Diego County which are being linked to the use of risky mortgage loans (notable because such increases are usually only noted at the tail end of a down-turn, not the front end):
San Diego County is experiencing mortgage foreclosure rates not seen for the past eight years, two monitoring companies reported yesterday.
Locally based DataQuick Information Systems said foreclosures totaled 171 last month, more than 10 times what they were a year ago and the highest since 1998.
Similarly, the number of default notices – the first step lenders take toward foreclosure – was 872, nearly triple the 334 filed in September 2005.
Meanwhile, RealtyTrac, based in Irvine, reported area default notices totaled 1,236, up from 287 a year ago, and notices of trust-deed sales – the final notice before foreclosure – were at 247, up from 56 over the same period.
DataQuick analyst John Karevoll attributed the rise to the flattening of home prices.
“The people who get into trouble are not able to use their homes to get out of trouble the way they were able to do when there was strong appreciation,” he said.
At the peak of the buying boom, he said, as many as 35 percent of borrowers nationally were signing up for ARMs. In San Diego the figure sometimes exceeded 70 percent, DataQuick has reported.
Banks rarely hold foreclosed properties for long. Rather they are usually quickly sold with the banks happy to settle for the remaining balance of the mortgage. I think we can agree that having increasing numbers of foreclosed homes on the market is not likely to support continued house price appreciation.
Heading up the coast, the San Francisco Chronicle reports the same phenomenon up their way
The number of homeowners in foreclosure has soared in Solano and Contra Costa counties in the past year, giving the East Bay counties the dubious distinction of having the third and fourth highest foreclosure rates in the state.
Foreclosure activity in Solano County increased nearly fivefold, while in Contra Costa County they almost quadrupled, according to the RealtyTrac research firm. The two counties helped give California the No. 1 ranking among states with the most foreclosure filings in September.
And from Sacramento, we have reports of falling home sales and prices.
New-home sales tumbled 46 percent in the third quarter from a year ago, the latest evidence of a struggling housing market in the Sacramento region.
Only 1,956 new homes were sold in the just-completed quarter in the six-county area — the fewest since the fourth quarter of 2005 and 1,634 fewer than a year ago, according to The Gregory Group. It was the worst third quarter since the Folsom company started keeping track of the market in 2000.
The region’s median-home price — meaning half the homes sold for more, the other half for less — dropped 3.9 percent to $440,240, the lowest price since the second quarter of 2004.
The third quarter started slow, possibly because hot weather dissuaded home-shoppers from tours, said Greg Paquin, owner of The Gregory Group. But business picked up in late August and September, and he expects sales could rise to 2,500 homes in the current quarter. The company tracks home sales in Sacramento, Placer, El Dorado, Yolo, Sutter and Yuba counties.
My favorite part of that last bit? Blaming falling house sales on ‘hot weather’ rather than the much more obvious reason that buyers cannot afford to buy houses that are no longer rising at these prices. Very funny.
”It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his job depends on not understanding it.”
And finally from LA, we have this report:
The number of sales in the six-county region fell 28.6% last month from a year ago to the lowest September level in nine years, and the median price of all Southern California homes rose 1.9% to $484,000, the smallest year-over-year gain since February 1997, DataQuick said.
Ventura County last month became the second Southland county to suffer a year-over-year price decline. Ventura County’s median price fell 3.3% to $584,000. San Diego County’s median price declined for the third straight month, dropping 4.4% to $476,000.
The median home price in Los Angeles County rose 3% to $509,000, as sales fell 27.9%. L.A.’s median — the point at which half of all homes sold for more and half for less — has given back all gains made since May, according to DataQuick.
So it would seem that there’s plenty of weakness all across the state of CA but it may not turn out as bad as it did in the early 1990’s because, this time, the downturn is happening for a very different set of reasons. Back then it was base closures and a job slump and this time it’s overbuilding, low affordability, and risky mortgages turning bad.
However, such stark, fundamental differences won’t prevent your average economist from drawing inappropriate comparisons to explain “this time, it will be different”.
It comes down to this. If you’d like to have your bank account cleaned out but you’d rather not see it coming, ditch your realtor and your common sense and find yourself an economist to advise you on your next real estate purchase.
All the best,
Chris
Copyright C. Martenson, 2006